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 Parliamentary Committees in Zambia's Third Republic: Partial Reforms; Unfinished Agenda∗
 
PETER BURNELL (University of Warwick) 
 
This article critically examines the contribution of Parliamentary committees in Zambia to 
democratic government. Several committees are of long-standing including the Committee on 
Government Assurances and Committee on Delegated Legislation; others, notably committees 
involved in departmental oversight were refashioned, expanded and given additional powers 
in 1999. They have worked hard to make government more open and accountable. Additional 
proposals for reforms to the committee system are currently being studied by a committee of 
Parliament.  Although measuring the 'effectiveness' of such committees is not easy due to 
conceptual and methodological difficulties, their ability to influence policy and administration 
is found to be severely limited due to the absence of effective mechanisms to enforce their 
recommendations. The article maintains that this situation is unlikely to alter significantly 
unless there are wider changes in the party system, the institutional balance of power between 
executive and legislature, and the political culture more generally. 
 
Introduction 
In Zambia, according to one prominent former Member of the National Assembly who is now 
Secretary General of the Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum, 
Parliament's work is 'shrouded in mystery and myth'.i This observation might seem 
unsurprising.  Zambia's Parliament has never enjoyed a high reputation, not least because of an 
enduring presidential bias to the political system. Moreover between the mid-1970s and 1990 
it was the country's declining economic fortunes not its political institutions that formed the 
principal object of attention, once social scientists became disillusioned with the failure of 
President Kaunda's seemingly innovative attempt to make 'humanism' the governing credo. 
Furthermore there is now a consensus that parliaments the world over are generally in decline, 
as political power is shifting to executives and as it leaks away from governments to other 
institutions such as economic actors and increasingly global forces - in Zambia's case to 
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international donors for example. However, the Third Republic in Zambia and the election of a 
new party to government and new president in 1991 stimulated expectations that the country 
could be about to cross the threshold of western-style liberal democracy.  Zambians too 
believed that power would be redistributed from the executive to the people and their 
representatives in the legislature. By lifting the veil on an important feature of today's 
Parliament, especially the scrutiny or oversight committees, this article makes a contribution 
to assessing how far those initial expectations have been met, and the reasons for the present 
mood of disappointment.ii
 
The study argues that the parliamentary committees have minimal effect in making 
government accountable, notwithstanding their hard work and the commencement of a 
programme of modernising reform in 1999.  Effective accountability demands not just that the 
executive is required to give an account of its conduct (answerability) but that the strictures of 
bodies that should hold government to account are enforceable. It is in the matter of 
enforceability that the committees are most deficient.  However, this defect is a weakness in 
the totality of executive-legislative relations as determined by Zambia's constitution; it is 
embedded in a cluster of institutional relations, whose reform is long overdue.iii The 
committees by themselves are relatively powerless to change that. But that fact does not make 
them irrelevant. On the contrary, the article suggests that the committees actually and 
potentially perform some very useful functions, in particular exposing the operations of 
government to a critical light - in a country where much political debate is of a polemical and 
personally-charged nature and pays too little attention to careful presentation of the evidence. 
After a brief introduction to the political context, the article proceeds by presenting detailed 
evidence about the performance of these little known institutions in Zambia, before drawing 
inferences about their effectiveness by reference to a checklist of functions or roles against 
which parliamentary committees can be assessed.  
 
In Zambia there is a programme of reforms to modernise Parliament, but will they help 
the committee system, in principle one of the leading agents of accountability, to fully realise 
its potential? Here the argument is much less sanguine. The article agrees that constitutional 
reforms like allowing the National Assembly to pass motions censuring individual ministers 
would represent an advance, in so far as ministers were then less likely to be captured by the 
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narrow agendas of the presidency or selfish interests. But not even the advocates of 'new 
institutionalism' who argue that the organisation of political life makes a difference,iv assert 
that institutional tinkering is a panacea - not in Zambia, not in any of the new and emerging 
democracies, and not even in the established democracies, where there is much evidence of an 
erosion of public confidence in government and in the legislators. In Zambia the formal 
political institutions cannot be divorced from such environmental factors as the informal 
patterns of neo-patrimonialism and clientelism (which undermine the distinction between 
public and private spheres and inject particularistic values into public service), the 
predominant party system and the extreme poverty of the people.v The United Nations 
Development Programme's Human Development Index places Zambia 143 out of 162 
countries; around 90 per cent of the population are reckoned to be trying to survive on the 
equivalent of less than two dollars a day. These contextual matters have profound political 
significance and occupy a big canvas. They have been explored elsewhere and are not the 
primary focus here. For the presumption that a comprehensive understanding of the 
parliamentary committees cannot be gained in complete isolation from the broader issues does 
not mean we should spurn more focused attempts at uncovering the 'mystery and myth'. After 
all, it would be absurd to pretend that nothing valuable can be discovered about something 
unless something is said about everything - an impractical proposition, anyway. 
 
Political Context 
Zambia's constitution provides for a hybrid form of government that combines a strong 
executive presidency with parliamentary characteristics and traditions inherited from the 
Westminster system. Parliament consists of the President, who is both head of state and head 
of government and is elected directly by the people, and the National Assembly, which 
comprises 150 elected seats and up to eight seats appointed by the President. According to 
Article 87 of the constitution the laws and customs of the Parliament of England shall apply to 
the National Assembly, with such modifications as Parliament itself has authorised. The 
President and Parliament both serve five-year terms, which run concurrently. The government 
is made up of the President and cabinet ministers and other ministers and deputy ministers - a 
total number approaching 70 - appointed by the President from the members of the House.  
The constitution states that cabinet shall formulate the policy of the government and shall be 
responsible for advising the President on policy.  It also says that cabinet and deputy ministers 
shall be accountable collectively to the National Assembly. But the notion that ministers 
should be individually so accountable has been resisted by the executive, on the grounds that 
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they are appointed by and answerable to the President.vi Apart from the special and limited 
grounds on which the President may be removed on grounds of incapacity, or impeached for 
violation of the constitution or gross misconduct, the chief means open to the assembly to 
enforce governmental accountability is by dissolving itself, which requires a two-thirds 
majority. This triggers general elections for Parliament and the Presidency. The National 
Assembly can also be dissolved by the President.  Thus, unlike purely presidential systems the 
two branches are not mutually independent. Since October 1991 the Presidency and a large 
majority of seats in Parliament have been held by the Movement for Multi-party Democracy 
(MMD), which won 125 and 131 of the elected seats in the 1991 and 1996 general elections. 
 
The assembly is best described as a reactive, not proactive body. Although MPs have 
the power to initiate both private members bills and private bills (to promote or benefit the 
interests of some particular person or group, not the general benefit), in practice the executive 
has monopolised the introduction of new legislation. Parliament enacts rather than makes law, 
and for this reason, according to Shugart and Carey, the term 'assembly' is a better description 
than 'legislature'.vii  Although this state of affairs is not unusual - indeed the conventional view 
of 'legislatures' is that their decline is 'commonplace, such decline being peculiarly severe in 
systems of parliamentary government' viii - it draws attention none the less to the relative 
importance of Parliament's powers of scrutiny and oversight of the executive. These are 
important areas where it can at least try to maximise its contribution to democracy. The 
powers are exercised by the Parliamentary committee system; in the words of a popular 
textbook a strong committee system is what largely defines a 'working' as opposed to a merely 
'talking' assembly.ix The extent to which in Zambia the committees' activities translate into 
real power and influence, and what that reveals about the conduct of government in the Third 
Republic since the MMD took office (1991), are the focus of this inquiry. 
 
The inquiry audits two General Purpose Committees whose brief ranges over all 
departments, namely the Committee on Government Assurances and Committee on Delegated 
Legislation (the third General Purpose Committee, the Public Accounts Committee is 
examined elsewherex). It also examines the record of the departmentally-oriented committees, 
especially since the reforms in 1999 that refashioned, expanded and gave additional powers to 
these oversight committees. Finally the survey examines the ad hoc select committees set up 
for the purpose of ratifying official appointments that are supposed to enjoy independence of 
the executive. The account is not concerned with the House-Keeping Committees, namely the 
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Standing Orders Committee (SOC) and the Committee on Privileges, Absences and Support 
Services, although the former, chaired by the Speaker, is a powerful body that selects the 
members of the sessional and ad hoc select committees. The seven members of the SOC 
include the Vice President, government Chief Whip and the Minister Without Portfolio 
(Michael Sata, who is also the MMD's National Secretary). The audit here draws on evidence 
from several years of reports of the committees and the government's written responses. It 
concludes with an account of the reasons why even further improvements to the committee 
system along lines that have already been agreed by the parliamentarians will not produce a 
quantum leap in their effective contribution to democratic government. However, before 
proceeding to the details it is necessary first to introduce the question of yardsticks for 
assessing performance. 
 
The Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committees 
It is widely recognised that Parliaments or assemblies can serve the interests of good 
government and democracy in a number of ways other than as law-making bodies, and the 
same point is true of committees. Some possible functions range from putting information in 
the public domain and holding government to account, to contributing to policy formation and 
taking government closer to the people. The variety of possibilities creates methodological 
difficulties for assessing how successful committees are. The problems of measuring 
effectiveness are well known, not least that we can never know the counterfactual.xi Different 
standpoints give rise to different judgments, especially where choices have to be made among 
multiple criteria and different rank orders of functions. The impact of committees can in any 
case be hard to identify and impossible to quantify in any strict sense. But this does not in 
itself mean committees fail to influence a government's thinking or conduct in ways both 
agreeable and disagreeable. Because different committees specialise in different tasks any 
attempt at an aggregate assessment can be misleading. Moreover, the risks of cultural 
relativism in devising performance indicators are ever present and there are dangers in 
applying inappropriate yardsticks to alien settings. For all these reasons, a logical place to start 
is with the aims and objectives as formally laid down by the instruments of authorisation. But 
of course these may not encapsulate the full range of effects or consequences, formal and 
informal, intended and unintended, some of which could be very significant for the 
democracy.  
 
Committee on Government Assurances 
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The Committee on Government Assurances is mandated to scrutinise all assurances, promises 
and undertakings made by cabinet ministers and deputy ministers on the floor of the house, 
usually at question time or during the budget presentation, with the objective of ensuring that 
they are implemented. The committee quizzes the ministries concerning action taken and seeks 
clarification of issues not adequately dealt with in the Action-Taken reports that the 
government is obliged to make and which it is the responsibility of the Vice-President to 
present to the House. Once the committee takes the view that the government has satisfactorily 
discharged its obligation the committee announces closure of the issue (departments can 
appeal against non-closure but the committee can resolve to keep the assurance open). 
Thus in the course of 13 meetings in 2000 for example, the committee reviewed 143 
assurances from 21 ministries, the Zambia Revenue Authority, Office of the Vice-President 
and Public Service Management Division (Cabinet Office). The assurances vary enormously 
in scale and complexity, from for instance the Public Service Reform Programme (a major 
retrenchment exercise in the bureaucracy) to the building of a local post office. The assurances 
that are investigated can refer to matters as different as the formulation of a promised new 
policy, steps to implement a policy, and the attainment of concrete results from 
implementation. Because of the all-embracing nature of this remit and the great diversity of 
the assurances the committee's capacity to produce impressive results is questionable, which in 
turn must colour any meaningful analysis of its performance. 
 
Furthermore the assurances can and often do go back several years, for example the 
2000 report went as far back as 1984 and itemised 17 assurances from the 1980s, 37 from the 
years 1990-1995 and 89 since 1985. In terms of effecting accountability there seems to be 
little point in chasing issue from former administrations. Moreover the scope to add new 
assurances is governed by the rate of closure. Given the slow pace at which the older items are 
closed some of them simply have to be quietly abandoned, if the entire process is not to be 
overwhelmed by an increasing backlog. However, it is not just the pre-1991 backlog but the 
fact that the committee continues to identify fairly recent assurances where it feels unable to 
announce closure that suggests the procedure is not wholly effective. The system has certainly 
not caused government to make only assurances that it knows it can and does keep. In the 
1997 report for instance, out of 135 assurances there were no closures and many requests to be 
kept informed of progress; 1998 saw 15 closures out of 169 assurances; 1999 saw seven 
closures out of 153 assurances.xii In 2000 a quarter of all assurances were closed, the majority 
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of them dating from after 1995. While this was a major improvement, it is too early to 
conclude there is an upward trend.  
 
The reasons why assurances remain unfulfilled could be more significant but are 
harder to discern. The reason cited most often by the government is lack of money, which 
crops up in a third of the cases.  Although this looks plausible - the state is as financially 
distressed as the nation's economy is depressed - the committee has in fact repeatedly rejected 
this explanation.  The explanation is that a deeper and more varied range of forces are at work, 
which reflect ill on the government: obstructive behaviour by the cabinet; bureaucratic inertia; 
confusion of responsibility between departments; financial mismanagement; slowness of 
government agencies to pioneer other ways of raising funds than by appealing to the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED); and, when ministers make promises on the 
floor of the House, amnesia about the financial constraints or a failure to cost all the resource 
implications first. The unpredictable behaviour of foreign donors is another factor; and the 
government in its Action-Taken reports is occasionally able to report progress as a result of 
donor initiatives to 'adopt' a spending item. A conscious intention to mislead the House when 
making assurances cannot be discounted. But where the main problem is MOFED's refusal to 
release funds to departments - something that is within its legal powers even when the 
expenditure has received Parliament's approval - there is not much the assurances committee 
can do or expect to see done. At best it can lend support to recommendations from the Public 
Accounts Committee and Estimates Committee that address the larger budgetary picture, in 
particular the sway of particularistic and personalised influences on spending allocations and 
actual disbursements.  
 
Committee on Delegated Legislation 
The Committee on Delegated Legislation scrutinises whether the powers to make orders, rules, 
sub-rules and by-laws delegated by Parliament are being properly exercised.  The instruments 
must be in accordance with the constitution or with statute law, and must not trespass unduly 
on personal rights and liberties or cause rights and liberties to be at the whim of administrative 
decisions. They must be concerned only with administrative details and not amount to 
substantive legislation. The committee, whose members usually include at least one MP with 
professional legal qualifications, meets around eight times a year.  The number of Statutory 
Instruments (SIs) examined ranges from around 40 to a high of 88 (in 1994). The reports 
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include consideration of the government's Action-Taken Reports on the committee's previous 
report and recommendations. 
 
If the committee is of the opinion that an instrument should be revoked or amended 
and reports such an opinion and the grounds to the House then the National Assembly has the 
opportunity to vote on the matter. In practice the committee's reports have tended to conclude 
with an overall judgment that the SIs did indeed comply with the requirements of the law, 
notwithstanding concern about some individual items such as poor legal drafting or the 
government's failure to respond appropriately to previous recommendations. The reports are 
relatively slim not least because many of the government's responses have been perfunctory. 
They have frequently passed comment on the government's habit of issuing SIs before 
Parliament has voted on the bill that would give authorisation, especially in matters relating to 
the budget. They also deplore the consistent failure by government to submit Explanatory 
Memoranda to the committee (as in respect of no less than 48 SIs in 1994 and 30 of the 74 SIs 
in 1997).xiii  Although on some occasions the government has taken corrective action to 
assuage the committee on others it has been defiant and simply restated its case. In short, 
government appears to believe it can ignore the committee's findings where it chooses to do so 
- not a particularly unique disposition, but in the Zambian context yet another sign of an 
underinstitutionalised state. 
 
Departmentally-oriented Committees 
In 1999 the seven departmentally-oriented 'watchdog' or investigatory committees were 
replaced by 11 new committees with the objective that for the first time all ministries and 
departments would be included in the arrangements for regular scrutiny and without overlap of 
responsibilities.xiv The package of reforms was born of a realisation that other parliamentary 
systems were making innovations to help strengthen the legislative branch vis-à-vis the 
executive.xv Also it was intended to create opportunities for public participation in the 
legislative process, by making the committee proceedings more open, thereby taking 
Parliament closer to the people. Thus the duties of the departmentally-oriented committees are, 
first, to study, report and make recommendations to the government through the House on the 
management and operations of executive bodies; second, to carry out detailed scrutiny of 
certain activities undertaken by government; third, to make, if deemed necessary, 
recommendations to the government on the need to review certain policies and/or legislation; 
 8
and fourth, to consider any Bills in committee stage that may be referred to them by the 
House. It was believed this last would lead to more thorough scrutiny of legislative proposals. 
 
The committees decide their own programme of work for the year. They are 
empowered to require witnesses from inside and outside government to provide information 
and to appear in person. The committees 'will be allowed to conduct public inquiries and the 
press should comment and report on their activities during their proceedings'.xvi Interested 
members of the public may submit written comments and may thereafter be invited to attend 
as witnesses. Once a committee report has been adopted by the House the government should 
reply within 60 days in the form of an Action-Taken Report tabled in the House. The executive 
is not required to implement committee recommendations providing it gives a convincing 
reason. This is nothing unusual especially in parliamentary systems that draw on Westminster 
traditions: in the UK 'select committees are, and can realistically only aspire to be, in the 
business of scrutiny and exposure, not of government'. xvii As with the other committees the 
departmentally-oriented committees are serviced by a member of the Clerk's Office, who can 
call on the specialised knowledge of a research staff of nine. 
 
The membership of the committees is usually eight, appointed on an annual basis 
(usually at least half are re-appointed from the previous year) and in theory with regard to 
party and gender balance, although the dominance of the National Assembly by men from the 
ruling party is a major constraint. The committees elect their own chair, drawn from the 
previous year's members and in some cases from outside the ruling party. Although the 1999 
reforms are still very recent, and operational difficulties in the initial stages of implementation 
are only to be expected, it is still possible to make some assessment of the new committees' 
performance, against the background of their predecessors.  But some important aspects of the 
reform agenda have not yet been implemented, such as allowing press attendance at meetings.  
One suggestion is that there is a concern that journalists could easily misrepresent the 
discussions, in advance of a final report being agreed.xviii  A realistic assessment is that the  
government is suspicious of the independent press, which it regards as partisan and unfairly 
critical of the government. It is wary of committee investigations being reported in the media 
before there is an opportunity to suppress the findings by persuading the House to agree that a 
report should not be adopted. The executive also resists the idea of taking the committee stage 
of legislation in the departmental committees and away from the floor of the House. It prefers 
the existing practice whereby the assembly is given very little notice of forthcoming legislative 
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initiatives, where debate can be controlled by containing it within the formal rules of the 
House, and where the construction of a tight timetable may permit only minimal opportunity 
for detailed external scrutiny and public discussion.  
 
 That said, in respect of their oversight responsibilities all 11 committees have met on a 
regular basis - up to 16 times a year in some cases - and taken evidence from Permanent 
Secretaries (only rarely Ministers) from a range of departments and other public sector bodies 
and outside organisations. They have produced at minimum annual reports for 1999 and 2000, 
some of them long and very weighty. The reports have included consideration of Action-Taken 
reports by the government (which can occupy as much as a quarter of a committee's report 
before it gets round to 'topical issues'). There is a pattern to the principal findings of the 
committees, summarised under four main points below. They tell us a good deal about how the 
government actually functions; but space constraints allow only a few illustrations to be cited. 
 
First, the committees reveal evidence of policy shortcomings - not so much policies 
that are not working successfully, as gaps where there is a policy vacuum, policy confusion 
and absence of clarity. For instance the government has 'not had a coherent policy framework 
on transport for a long time'.xix But although the committee that reported this observation 
administered a clear rebuke, the attempts to assign responsibility for policy delays are 
generally quite problematic, and this frustrates the need for answerability. The departmental 
submissions tend to put the onus on the cabinet, whereas the Action-Taken Reports assign the 
blame to the departments.xx In this game of 'buck passing' probably both are at fault: a minister 
will wait for clear signals from the leadership before finalising a policy document for cabinet 
approval.  The reason why there is no clear steer from cabinet can be opaque; one could be 
that in recent years the President, who chairs the meetings, has been greatly involved in 
foreign affairs including playing a mediating role in the war in the neighbouring Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. But committees have at least flagged up some serious consequences of 
policy inertia, as in for example the reluctance of foreign investors to invest in 
telecommunications.  A second illustration is the concern voiced in committee over the 
inadequate regulatory framework for the commercial banking system, underscored by a 
succession of seven bank failures between 1995 and 1999 followed by an eighth in April 2001. 
The devastating social and economic consequences of the spread of HIV/AIDS is yet another 
area where the government's slowness to seize the magnitude of the problem and formulate a 
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clear official response has been highlighted, although so far the official response has been 
unimpressive.  
 
Second, the committees disclose that political interference in policy implementation is 
a major problem that both distorts the policies and undermines performance. This was found to 
be responsible for the failure of the 'visionary reforms' pioneered in the health sector, for 
example.  Ministerial interference in matters that should be the province of the Central Health 
Board produced centralisation, not the decentralisation envisaged by the reforms. Hospital 
Executive Directors were said to live in constant fear because the Directors were changed 
every time a new Minister was appointed.xxi In this instance the Minister, Nkandu Luo, was 
moved to another portfolio two weeks before the Committee presented its report. The foreign 
affairs committee noted the politicisation of appointments in the diplomatic service, where 
preference was given to MMD cadres who lacked the necessary qualifications. The legal 
affairs committee noted there is much interference by government in the operations of the 
Anti-Corruption Commission 'especially in high profile cases'.xxii The transport committee 
seized on politicisation as being responsible for the bad management of the Tanzania-Zambia 
Railway Authority. Possibly most damaging of all was the high-level political interference in 
the privatisation of the state-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), a disposal 
that was critical to the economy. The Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) was marginalised 
from the decision-taking. The Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour, chaired by an 
MMD MP, first raised serious issues in 1999 and, judging the government's response to be 
unsatisfactory, returned to them again in 2000. It claimed to find evidence not simply of 
procrastination but illegal conduct, procedural irregularities and corruption, all of them costing 
the treasury and the country dearly in a number of ways. The report's contents were very 
damaging. The findings were mentioned frequently in the political campaigns against 
President Chiluba and the MMD government that began to stir early in 2001, an election year 
for parliament and the presidency. 
 
Third there are claims that some weakness of policy implementation owe to failure by 
the government to adequately consult with stakeholders. The transport minister's (Nkandu 
Luo) decision that all minibuses be painted blue (the MMD party colour, incidentally) may 
look trivial, but as the communications committee (2000) observed, the decision and the short 
time allowed to comply with it caused much resentment. More serious is the government's 
failure to consult organised labour over the privatisation of ZCCM; it was always likely that 
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many workers would become unemployed as a consequence of sale agreements, even where 
retrenchment was not a condition demanded by prospective purchasers. In fact organised 
labour argued in its evidence to the economic affairs committee that the government has no 
labour policy. Similarly other committees have indicted the government for failing to consider 
development issues on a longer-term basis and in a more consultative mode than just the 
annual budget preparations, which exhibit a hand-to-mouth approach to policy-making. 
 
Fourth there is much evidence of inertia, non-implementation and failure to take action 
to implement decisions. This criticism applies especially to promises made in Action-Taken 
reports. Many of the government's replies there are of a 'holding' nature: they do not inspire 
confidence that a problem has been adequately addressed. The trail often goes cold once the 
government has made its report, even where a committee persists in revisiting an issue or 
raising the same concern time and again. While there may sometimes be truth in the 
government's claims that the problem is a shortage of funds, there are also cases where it is 
undoubtedly political reasons that predominate, as in the failure to take steps to implement the 
recommendations of the Media Reform Committee (1993). In 2000 the minister treated the 
Committee on Information and Broadcasting Services to an unconvincing defence. He failed 
to explain why for instance no moves had been made to incorporate press freedom in the 
constitution or to take action on the committee's recommendation in 1999 to remove the many 
legal infringements on free expression (such infringements range across ten different Acts plus 
the Penal Code). After all, in November 1999 the minister advised the House that a task force 
to review the legislation had already met and finished its work and that its proposals simply 
needed cabinet approval.xxiii He made clear, however, that government would not privatise the 
government-controlled daily newspapers, which are heavily loss-making and desperately need 
new capital investment. 
 
Similarly the Committee on Legal Affairs, Governance, Human Rights and Gender 
Matters discovered that the Gender and Development Division of Cabinet Office misdirected 
its energies, by giving preference to attendance at international conferences rather than reach 
down to the grass-roots at home. The same committee exposed the severe constraints under 
which governance institutions like the Electoral Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission, 
Drug Enforcement Commission and Human Rights Commission operate, due to gross 
underfunding. The monies that are denied to these bodies by MOFED's habit of reducing their 
budget requests and then releasing only part of the money voted by Parliament contrast with 
 12
the regular overspending and excess (unauthorised) spending on administration elsewhere in 
the government, such as the Office of the President. Thus there is a perception of a 'lack of 
political will to ensure that human rights are respected and promoted'.xxiv  
 
In sum the committees have exposed many causes for concern about the conduct of 
government. A plausible response might be 'well, they would do, wouldn't they?' Their 
mandate to carry out scrutiny and oversight contains a bias towards the negative - something 
that is likely to be accentuated further in the representation of their findings by political 
scientists, who are trained to be critical. However, it would be difficult to argue that the reports 
are unreasonable in any sense. And it is unusual for reports to be deemed so flawed or 
inaccurate by the government that it urges the House to send them back to the committee. 
Moreover the reports are not so unbalanced as to be completely devoid of examples of 
commendation for the government, including for actions taken in response to committee 
recommendations. But the positive findings are far outweighed by the negative. 
 
Ad Hoc Select Committees 
The constitution and subsidiary legislation require that certain presidential appointments must 
be ratified by Parliament, and for this reason select committees of Parliament - usually ten 
members - are appointed from time to time to scrutinise nominations and make 
recommendations to the House.xxv The process should ensure that the correct procedures have 
been followed and that nominees have the necessary qualifications and experience, all of 
which should protect the manner of appointment from improper political interference. 
 
In some cases, notwithstanding the fact that they are made by the President the 
appointments relate to institutions to check executive power and help prevent abuse of that 
power - instruments of horizontal accountability that are supposed to complement the vertical 
accountability to society that the National Assembly should effect. Thus since November 1991 
there have been at least 24 such committees established to consider the following 
appointments: the Puisne Judges; Attorney-General; Solicitor-General; Director of Public 
Prosecutions; Secretary to the Cabinet; the Permanent Human Rights Commission (granted 
autonomy in 1996); the Director-General of the Anti-Corruption Commission; the Electoral 
Commission (granted autonomy in 1996); the Auditor-General; the Governor of the Bank of 
Zambia; Board of the ZPA; Board of the Regulators for the  Communications Authority. 
During the MMD's second administration (1996-2001) almost all the committees were chaired 
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by Vernon Mwaanga, one of President Chiluba's oldest and closest allies. This suggests the 
executive became increasingly aware of the political importance of such appointments and 
adds to other compelling evidence pointing to the abandonment of the liberal enthusiasm 
shown in the MMD's very early days. 
 
The fact that the committee reports have only very infrequently objected to a 
nomination or, even more rarely signalled rejection (in July 1992 a nomination to the ZPA 
Board was rejected) does not necessarily mean they are no more than a 'rubber stamp'. The 
same raw data could instead be evidence that the executive, wary of being tripped up by the 
committee, has usually exercised its powers of nomination and appointment with due care. But 
some of the appointments have incurred political comment in the House, such as over a 
nomination to the Human Rights Commission in 1998. An objection grounded on the 
nominee's former role in government was countered by a speaker for the government who 
claimed the appointment would add a 'moderating factor' to a commission that had already 
exceeded its powers (the Commission was alleged to have briefed the media about its early 
findings of rights abuses, before first informing government).xxvi  There was also a difference 
of opinion over the suitability of Justice Bwalya's appointment as chair of the Electoral 
Commission, given that he was a card-carrying member of the MMD. At least one member of 
the committee wanted to oppose the nomination; some opposition politicians took (and still 
take) the view that the Commission should comprise representatives of all main parties, if it is 
to acquire a reputation for impartiality.  
 
More generally, the committees have not been shy of commenting on the procedural 
issues.  They have complained when the executive has not made adequate consultations before 
making the nominations, or has left vacancies unfilled (as with five of the 12 positions on the 
ZPA Board at the time of the ZPA's 1999 Progress Report, some of them vacant for more than 
two years). They have complained where the executive failed to submit names for 
Parliamentary approval, made reappointments after the expiry of the initial term without 
consulting Parliament or reappointed members who had previously been dismissed for 
contravening the regulations (ZPA Board, again). They have also complained when 
committees have been allowed insufficient time to perform their investigations and when 
appointments appeared to have taken effect or been announced even before the committee 
could begin its work. This last illustrates the very nature of the problem the select committees 
are there to check, namely an executive inclination to exceed its powers. As committee chair, 
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Mwaanga expressed concern in the House at the government's failure to respect a previous 
committee's reminder that Parliament's power is to ratify, not merely to 'confirm'.xxvii The 
committees have on other occasions used the opportunity to criticise the terms of the Act that 
authorise an appointment for being vague or ambiguous. For example on the appointment in 
2000 of the Governor of the central bank it pointed out that the Bank of Zambia Act 
contravenes accepted norms of transparency and accountability, by making the Governor both 
responsible to the Board of Directors and chairman of the Board.  In July 1997 the committee 
on the appointment of Supreme Court Judges used the opportunity to express deep concern at 
the funding arrangements for the judiciary, which it believed compromised judicial autonomy 
and undermined the separation of powers. The same concerns were expressed in the House on 
the occasion of accepting a report ratifying nominations to the High Court, in March 2001. In 
sum, although Parliament has not in practice frustrated presidential appointments the 
institution of select committees has offered a platform for parliamentarians to raise wider 
issues of concern relating to governance. 
 
Assessment 
What do we learn from the audit so far? Clearly institutional arrangements are in place to help 
combat executive dominance. But their performance, while not so weak as to warrant calling 
Parliament a 'useless house',xxviii has been disappointing, notwithstanding the high level of 
commitment and seriousness of purpose of some MPs. There is a systematic pattern to the 
weaknesses and limitations. Their origins date from well before the Third Republic - not just 
in the one-party state of the Second Republic (1972-91) but as far back as independence 
(1964) and the period of British rule before then, as studies of those periods clearly show.xxix 
The contemporary audit is best elaborated in the form of a checklist of functions or roles 
against which effectiveness can be assessed. These roles of information-gathering, informing 
debate, contributing to policy and policy agendas, holding government to account, and 
bringing Parliament closer to the people, together with their influence on the parliamentarians 
themselves, are drawn from the generic literature on parliamentary committees. That literature 
is particularly but not exclusively focused on the British experience of select (scrutiny) 
committees.xxx Although that source might be considered too ethnocentric, in practice a very 
similar roster of objectives features in the Zambians' own recent Report of the Parliamentary 
Reforms Committee on Reforms in the Zambian Parliament (November 2000). 
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However, it is worth noting first that whatever shortcomings we find in Zambia, 
evidence from Westminster suggests that expectations should not be set unreasonably high. It 
is said that the select committees in Britain, which were expanded from a small handful only 
around 20 years ago, have been subservient and unwilling to confront the executive. They are 
judged to have failed to exert influence over government policies at large or even to make a 
major impact on opinion in the House of Commons. They are 'only operating at the margins of 
power'; added to which, Parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation ranges from 'weak to 
virtually non-existent'.xxxi The Labour government's initial response to a recent report by MPs 
for the Hansard Society decrying the limited impact of select committees and urging the 
executive to stop influencing the selection of chairs and allow more time for the Commons to 
discuss committee reports, was typical. It removed the robust chairpersons of two important 
committees.xxxii Even in the United States, which arguably has the world's most powerful 
legislature - truly a law-making body - most commentators agree that the Congress performs 
its functions of oversight poorly. It tends to wait for disasters to happen, causing it to exercise 
oversight retrospectively ('fire alarm' surveillance) rather than endeavour to avert policy 
failures in the first place through exercising 'police patrol' oversight.xxxiii  
 
Information and debate 
First, there is the role of information gathering, which in turn should help raise the level of 
debate and promote the objective of more open government. In the judgment of a keen 
observer of Britain's select committees 'Probably the greatest beneficiaries are those seeking 
knowledge and information. The minutes of evidence …are goldmines in this respect.'xxxiv 
Zambia's parliamentary committees have indeed shed light on some dark places. For example, 
would we have known about the collapse of 3000 local courts in Zambia's Eastern Province 
(described as a disaster in the administration of justice at that level) if this finding had not 
surfaced in the 1999 report of the Committee on Government Assurances?  Over time the 
accumulated reports and the government's written replies contribute a substantial amount of 
empirical detail on the workings of the government - on what it has and has not done.  This is 
especially valuable given that, unlike in Britain or the United States other sources of 
information, both primary and secondary, are threadbare. 
 
However, there is also the question of the information that is not revealed by these 
reports, most notably where government has withheld information, where committees have not 
asked the most searching questions or have lacked the resources to probe deeply. Readers 
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familiar with Zambia can easily identify a number of very sensitive issues where many 
Zambians, not just MPs, would like to learn more, and yet committees have not shed 
illumination. The answers are more likely to lie in government-commissioned reports of 
inquiry, whose findings are withheld for fear of acute political embarrassment. An example 
dating from early on in the first MMD administration is the circumstances of the Gabon air 
disaster, 27 April 1993: who gave the order that the national soccer team should be flown in a 
Zambian military aircraft that was known to be defective and which then crashed, killing all 
on board? More recent examples concern instances of high level corruption or, at minimum 
incompetence in respect both of public procurement and income-raising, such as the large sum 
that appears to have been lost to the treasury through an exclusive cobalt marketing deal that 
ZCCM managers agreed with intermediaries in the Bahamas, prior to privatisation.xxxv
 
Moreover, information is only valuable in so far as it is easily accessible and comes to 
the attention of relevant constituencies - the parliamentarians, the wider policy communities, 
opinion-formers and society at large. Does the information-gathering lead to 'informing' where 
and when it can most make a difference? Alas, there are major reservations. Committee 
reports are often placed in the MPs' pigeon-holes only the day or evening immediately prior to 
being formally presented to the floor of the House, which minimises the chance that MPs will 
be familiar with the contents. The potential of the committees' work to inform and raise the 
quality of parliamentary debate is limited accordingly. In fact the debates on the reports are 
often monopolised by members of the relevant committee and those few ministers who are 
obliged to respond. For example the debate on the first report of the governance committee, 
whose remit straddles highly political issues directly relevant to the autonomy and complexion 
of the House, attracted just 11 substantive contributions from the floor. These included three 
by members of the committee, three by ministers and only three by MMD back-benchers.  
Evidence from a committee report is not often referred to in debates or question time on 
occasions other than when the report is first presented and formally considered for adoption.  
In fact participation overall in the assembly is very uneven: attendance is sometimes poor and 
the records show that in any one sitting up to 30 MMD back-benchers will make no verbal 
intervention of any description.xxxvi
 
As for the chances of informing public debate outside Parliament, coverage of the 
proceedings of the National Assembly in the government-controlled media has been described 
by an MMD MP as 'very pathetic and a calculated move by the official controllers of these 
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public media to embarrass this House'.xxxvii The two government-controlled dailies (Times of 
Zambia; Zambia Daily Mail) present brief 'highlights' of the debate of a committee report on 
the front page of the following day's copy and very occasionally will make it the lead story. 
The accounts, while reproducing critical remarks about the government, are factual and devoid 
of comment, interpretation or analysis.xxxviii It is left to the independent papers (primarily The 
Post, and the weekly The Monitor) to follow up stories in the manner of investigative 
journalism and revisit the issues on subsequent occasions, building up a more sustained picture 
and reminding readers where the government has not taken corrective action.xxxix But even 
these are constrained by legislation inhibiting media reporting and debate. The National 
Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act that is supposed to secure absolute freedom of speech 
inside the Assembly has served to inhibit free speech by MPs outside the House, where they 
risk charges of breach of privilege and immunity. An MP will be sanctioned by the Speaker if 
he is reported saying outside the assembly that Parliament is a 'rubber stamp'. Irrespective of 
how true the claim is, it constitutes an offence to 'the dignity of the House'. Similarly a critical 
commentary on the President's address to the state opening of Parliament is also likely to 
attract censure from the Speaker. The penal code gives a wide-ranging construction to the 
notion 'seditious material' and allows the President to ban any publication deemed inimical to 
public interests. In particular the 'catch-all' nature of the State Security Act 'has a considerable 
deterrent effect' that inhibits civil servants from supplying information of the sort that would 
enable the media to elaborate on findings noted in parliamentary reports.xl   
 
The public has virtually no access to the committee reports. MPs are not given extra 
copies they can distribute. And as the Committee on Education, Science and Technology has 
made clear, the complete absence of public funding of research at the universities or any other 
institute means there is very little research activity apart from what foreign donors take an 
interest in and choose to finance. Often they employ their own researchers, and typically they 
get to keep the results. Thus the committee's view is that the country 'did not know itself well 
enough because data was not readily available'. The accumulation of committee reports will in 
time offer a fascinating primary source. But the chances that it will fuel policy-relevant 
analyses by third parties and feed into official deliberations in that way, are not promising: the 
government is 'at the periphery of research activities' and looks set to remain there.xli
 
Policies and policy agendas 
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Although MMD ministers often complain that opposition MPs should not just denigrate their 
policies but propose constructive alternatives, like governments the world over they are shy of 
admitting that any of their policy initiatives are borrowed from their critics. Even in Britain it 
is said that the observable effect of select committees on policy making is at best 'indirect and 
marginal, contextual rather than substantive'.xlii  Zambia's parliamentary committees have 
focused more on the details of policy and especially implementation than undertake a 
responsibility for overall policy advice. Even so they have sought to place issues on or higher 
up the policy agenda, by drawing attention to existing weaknesses and shortcomings. While 
the concerns may have been in circulation already, they were given extra prominence and so 
stood more chance of catching the government's attention. An example is the dawning 
realisation that post-privatisation monitoring of agreements with foreign investors is essential 
to ensure that at least some of the profits made in Zambia are reinvested in the country. This 
issue, flagged up by several committees, came right to the fore in January 2001 when not the 
committees' prescience but the accelerating adverse impact of the externalisation of capital on 
the national currency drove President Chiluba to seek an understanding on exchange retention, 
with the business community. 
 
Other issues where more than one committee has given attention and also reinforced 
the exposure given elsewhere, especially the Public Accounts Committee, include the manner 
of  privatisation - strongly criticised by the business sector - and the Public Service Reform 
Programme. However there are few identifiable cases of new legislative initiatives being made 
by the government in response to specific recommendations from committee. An exception 
could be the tightening of the regulatory framework for the commercial banking sector, in 
2000. But even here procrastination over legislating against money-laundering continues to 
raise significant problems, in the view of not just the Drug Enforcement Commission but the 
Secretary to the Treasury as well. In another example, in March 2000 the cabinet adopted a 
national gender policy after being pressed to do so by the legal affairs committee. The three 
female members of the committee included the chairperson - Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika, an 
ex-MMD MP who campaigns strongly on gender issues. However the policy has been 
criticised for not setting clear targets and goals, and there has been no concrete action.xliii  
 
Holding government to account 
The question of how government responds to the committees' both when they are issuing 
demands for information and when advancing recommendations is critical to the objective of 
 19
accountability. In Britain it has been said that the taking of evidence can be valuable in its own 
right as a means of holding ministers and others to account.xliv It is not essential to produce a 
really damning report by a committee in order to show that it made its mark. Neither should 
the effectiveness of a committee be inferred from the degree of hostility shown towards its 
findings, any more than it can be equated to the number of its recommendations the 
government accepts. That said, the Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour can be singled 
out for discomfiting government over its allegations concerning the privatisation of ZCCM 
core and non-core assets.  In December 1999, following a lively debate during which no less 
than five ministers and deputies felt obliged to defend the government, the Vice-President 
advised the House that it would be difficult to produce a meaningful Action-Taken Report in 
response to the committee's report. Almost 12 months later the government mobilised its 
majority in the House to throw the 2000 report back to the committee, through a 'vote by 
accalamation'.xlv On both occasions the government claimed errors and inconsistencies 
detracted from the report's validity. Critics claim the government is running scared. 
 
Elsewhere there have been a few examples of committees feeling slighted by the 
failure of a witness to appear or, much more often, by witnesses appearing not to take a 
committee's inquiries seriously.xlvi On the one hand there are many instances where 
government voiced agreement to specific recommendations in committee reports. Just as 
common, however are the recommendations where the government is subsequently judged to 
have failed to take adequate action, often compounded by failure to provide a satisfactory 
explanation. Not every ministry or department has complied with the legal requirement to 
produce an Action-Taken Report within 60 days of the House adopting a committee's report; 
their responses have come only after repeated reminders by the Clerk. Equally the Committee 
on Government Assurances has not obviously inhibited the government from making 
assurances that it later proves unable or unwilling to keep. So, although the requirement on 
government to respond with Action-Taken reports is excellent in principle it breaks down in 
practice; as one committee observed, the government had not taken any action at all 'apart 
from making promises to take action. Your committee recommends that government submits 
to them what it has done and not what it will do on the concerns of your committee'.xlvii
 
In some cases the primary reason lies with external constraints that are beyond the 
government's control, such as unpredictable behaviour by the donors. And perhaps it is 
unreasonable to speculate whether ministers and officials will from now on attach more weight 
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to the possibility of being 'exposed' in a committee report, in consequence of the 1999 reforms 
exerting a lagged effect. But the evidence from the 1990s as a whole is not encouraging. The 
conclusion is inescapable that reports and Action-Taken responses provide a formal procedure 
of answerability but without enforceability, the last being necessary to establish an effective 
instrument of accountability. Indeed, one suspicion is that the committees' work is viewed 
inside the government almost as an end in itself, as tangible evidence of democracy, or 
something that reduces the need for government to adjust its own behaviour. This is an 
unhappy conclusion, although arguably less dismal than where just the opportunity to hold 
debates in the House is argued to be proof of democratic accountability and is used as a ploy 
to suffocate potentially superior mechanisms of scrutiny, such as specialised 'watchdog' 
committees.xlviii But in the circumstances the oversight committees look more like a token 
display than a serious contribution to democratic governance. 
 
Parliament and the people 
Access to MPs in the House by members of the electorate is 'extremely difficult', according to 
Bonnie Tembo, Executive Director of the Anti-voter Apathy Project, a Zambian civic 
association.xlix  The new committees have not yet brought Parliament closer to 'the people', not 
least because vital components of the 1999 reforms have yet to be implemented. The physical 
location of the National Assembly on Manda hill and the security arrangements there impose a 
degree of separation even from the rest of Lusaka. From outside the capital Parliament looks 
very remote; in the eyes of MPs its role, function and procedures are not widely understood by 
the people.l Moreover there is no strong tradition of MPs representing sectional interests, 
which owes much to the longstanding domination of vertical cleavages in society over 
horizontal functional ties,li the latter being reduced even further by the industrial and 
economic decline. And compared with Britain the absence of academics, experienced 
politicians and other individuals belonging to relevant knowledge communities from the lists 
of witnesses and other sources of evidence consulted by parliamentary committees is very 
noticeable. Even so the committees have provided some opportunities for organised groups to 
be consulted and represent their views and interests direct to Parliamentarians. This may 
provide a 'safety valve' of sorts. But the enthusiasm is likely to wane if the exercise comes to 
be viewed as rather pointless, a mere charade.  
 
The proportion of submissions that committees have invited from the private sector 
especially in respect of economic affairs, communications, transport, and agriculture has 
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accelerated. This is an inevitable consequence of liberalisation of the economy and 
privatisation of parastatals: government figures claim that more than 240 of 280 state 
enterprises have been privatised since 1991, the great majority since 1995. Private enterprise 
has used the opportunity to communicate demands like more public spending on internal 
security in order to promote a safe investment climate, and faster processing of leasehold title 
to land, as well as warning against substituting private monopolies for state monopolies. Also, 
in health and education where non-governmental organisations (NGOs) make a major 
contribution to service delivery, the submissions have favoured NGOs and professional 
groups. For example the health committee has provided organisations fighting HIV/AIDS with 
a forum to lobby for increased attention and funds from government. But with regard to 
topical issues covered by ten of the departmentally-oriented committees (the local governance 
committee is an exception because of its unique focus on audit), the summoning of witnesses 
still privileges the public sector (Permanent Secretaries, chief executives, heads of governance 
institutions) over others in the ratio 4:3. Access by 'cause' groups (as distinct from 'interest 
groups' like peak organisations representing business and labour) has been mainly restricted to 
the Committee on Legal Affairs, Governance, Human Rights and Gender Matters. In 2000 
representatives of the independent news media declined to give evidence to the information 
and broadcasting committee (early evidence of lack of confidence in the value of the 
proceedings), although the committee still went on to make 27 recommendations aimed at 
strengthening autonomous media.  The government's suspicion of the press and prominent 
NGOs whose agendas it finds too challenging creates a negative climate. It has inhibited 
MMD MPs from constructing potentially mutually beneficial relations with civic actors, and 
serves to limit the direct access those actors have to ministries and departments.lii  
 
Impact on MPs 
What impact have the committees had on the parliamentarians themselves and on how they 
view their role in relation to the governing process?  The practice of rotating the membership 
of committees has not helped MPs to develop individual expertise in specialised policy areas, 
which is one theoretical advantage. But the inter-party or cross-party nature of the committees' 
work is more worthy of note, given the party-based system of political representation. We are 
unable to say how many divisive issues relating to policy have been deliberately avoided by 
committees so as to maintain internal harmony and avoid 'rocking the boat'. But a number of 
reports including some drafted under MMD chairs have been hard-hitting while showing no 
signs of serious rifts. It seems that committee work has encouraged at least some MPs to avoid 
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the strict confines of party discipline and to value their role as members of the assembly 
sharing a common interest in pressing the executive to improve its performance. Also, MMD 
members of committees have joined in voicing their support in the House for their committees' 
recommendations to strengthen institutions of governance like the Auditor General, judiciary 
and quasi-judicial bodies, that should perform as horizontal checks on the executive. 
Recommendations that such institutions should be given greater powers, that they should 
report direct to the National Assembly and not to the President first, that they be allotted more 
resources and that control over funding should be transferred from the executive to the 
Assembly, have been typical. 
 
When asked to explain this independence of spirit by some MMD MPs within the 
committee setting a non-MMD MP suggested that the committee environment provided an 
opportunity for MPs to 'get things off their chest' without seriously impairing their relations 
with the Chief Whip. MMD MPs know that, for the time being anyway the government can 
(and probably will) ignore the burden of the reports and calculate that it will not pay a heavy 
political price. Such is the confidence of the leadership in the superior persuasive power of 
patronage and clientelistic-based political appeals.Yet some MMD MPs also sincerely believe 
that their committee's recommendations would actually help policy delivery and so could 
benefit the standing of the ruling party, themselves included. Prospective MMD chairs allow 
their colleagues to take part in criticising the executive in return for support for their 
candidature for the chair - an appointment that caries with it valuable extra allowances.liii And 
although MPs do not themselves credit the committees with the capacity to inflict wounds on 
the government, there is a perception that the oversight committees are at least much bolder 
now than in the Second Republic (1972-91).liv  
 
Thus, although different committees have performed differently, it would be premature 
to say they have fallen into the trap of being 'foot soldiers' of the government - a fate that 
might seem all too possible given that the ruling party dominates the membership.lv Indeed 
committees with highly sensitive portfolios like economic management or governance have 
been distinguished by their robust approach, as have the Public Accounts Committee and the 
Estimates Committee. Of course by pleading poverty of resources as the reason for their 
inertia departmental spokesmen will intend that the MPs then communicate the case for better 
funding to MOFED, but in many instances committees have shown impatience with this 
explanation. One of the more explicit examples of ministerial lobbying was the appeal by the 
 23
Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services to the scrutiny committee to note that 
financial constraints prevented him extending satellite-based radio and television coverage 
throughout the country. However the unfulfilled commitment was not a priority set by 
Parliament but a pledge made by the President! In general terms the committee that has 
behaved least like a fierce watchdog and has been least inclined to summon evidence from 
outside the public service, so denying everyone the benefit of independent advice, is the 
Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs.  National security is one area where the 
executive can legitimately refuse to submit evidence. And the infrequency with which foreign 
affairs provide the subject matter of questions in Parliament suggests this area of policy is 
regarded as an executive, and specifically presidential, prerogative, rather than being the 
business of Parliament.lvi
 
In conclusion, the principle that a clear demarcation exists between responsible 
government and organs whose function is to keep government responsive and accountable is 
both long established and logically tenable. It counsels against arrangements to share 
executive powers with parliamentarians who are not members of the government. The 
principle is well understood by senior ministers in the MMD government, who from time to 
time remind the back-benches that it is not their job to direct the government. Even so, the 
performance of Zambia's committees legitimately charged with ensuring that government has 
done properly and within bounds what it said it would do and has carried out Parliament's 
wishes as enacted in law, bears out a familiar adage: 'powers do not necessarily mean power'. 
In that respect the Third Republic differs very little from its predecessors. What, then, are the 
future prospects?  
 
Future Prospects 
MPs and officers of the National Assembly are aware that improvements in the legislative 
component of democratic governance are desirable if only in order to catch up with other 
African countries where the delegation of parliamentary business to committees has increased. 
A set of 73 recommendations was encapsulated in the Report of the Parliamentary Reforms 
Committee on Reforms in the Zambian Parliament: Phase 1, which was submitted to the 
Speaker in November 2000. They had been agreed by a special plenary session of Parliament. 
By April 2001 a further committee of eight MPs (three ministers, the Chief Whip, two MMD 
back-benchers and two non-MMD MPs) was appointed to consider the modalities of 
'modernisation'. 15 of the 73 recommendations involve the committee system (eight being 
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judged inexpensive and 12 capable of being implemented in a short period), including the 
sending of bills to the departmentally-oriented committee after the first reading and the 
holding of budget hearings there as well. Another recommendation is that committee meetings 
should be broadcast live when considering issues of substantial national interest. These ideas 
together with press attendance at meetings and the holding of public hearings on issues outside 
Lusaka are among the priorities identified by the Clerk of the National Assembly.lvii A 
considerable expansion in the staff and research capabilities of the National Assembly has also 
been identified as vital to support increased committee responsibilities and activity.lviii More 
generous funding would enable committee members to carry out tours of inspection and fact-
finding missions especially outside the capital.lix A few of the recommendations are already 
under way but most await more determined efforts. One of the major challenges here will be to 
develop external links with organisations that can bring outside expertise and experience to 
bear.  
 
However, although on paper the reform programme looks impressive there can be no 
guarantee that any of the recommended changes, not even more ample funding, will 
dramatically alter executive-legislative relations unless there are changes to the constitution 
and in the party system and political culture. As Weaver and Rockman have argued, there is 
no 'institutional fix' to policy problems; moreover the functioning of institutions is 'influenced 
by the historical and societal contexts in which they developed, evolved and have operated'.lx 
A well-established view of select committees is that not only will they reflect the weaknesses 
(as well as strengths) of Parliament more broadly but legislatures in turn tend to be influenced 
by the executive to which they spend most of their time responding. Thus, generally speaking 
the way that a committee functions cannot be understood in isolation from their wider 
institutional environment lxi - and that means not only formal organisational structures but also 
the informal practice of customs, conventions, norms and mores. The Zambian situation is 
illustrative. Five groups of points will be made. 
 
First, at the heart of executive-legislative relations there is confusion over collective 
and individual responsibility that in practice allows both the cabinet and ministers individually 
to hide behind one another. This weakens answerability and takes away enforceability. The 
legislature has few effective sanctions against a minister's failure to produce a satisfactory 
response to committee recommendations. The powers to refuse to pass a bill (or threaten to do 
so) and to reject a department's budget after the annual debate on the Estimates are not 
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vacuous but they are inflexible and inappropriate.  Indeed it is precisely the issue of 
inadequate sanctions that caused much heated argument over the proposed reforms to the 
committee structure when they were first put to a special meeting of the assembly on 4 
December 1999. That particular meeting had to be abandoned as a result.lxii  
 
Constitutional provisions to enable legislators to invoke motions of censure or no 
confidence in ministers individually (as well as collectively) would add a measure of 
enforceability to the current arrangements for accountability, even if the effect worked mainly 
through anticipatory action taken against ministers by the President. Such a provision could 
require a two-thirds majority of the House; possibly it could be made non-binding. But a 
significant extra dimension would be added if the President was obliged to remove a minister 
who received an adverse vote, or if the Vice-President and entire cabinet had to be replaced 
when the government lost a confidence vote. It could well be true that in legislatures that draw 
heavily on the Westminster model there is no way of 'forcing' a government to implement 
committee recommendations.lxiii  But as Shugart and Carey show, 'there is a huge variety of 
institutional arrangements for assembly-executive relations in systems generally grouped 
together as presidential',lxiv and there is plenty of scope for Zambians to recalibrate their own 
institutional balance. In fact Olson's observation that the place and functioning of legislatures 
'are by no means settled in established democracies, much less in the newer ones'lxv is 
particularly apposite to Zambia today. Eventually enough Zambian people may see that the 
legitimacy of government would be enhanced by institutional arrangements that made the 
executive visibly more accountable. 
 
Second, whatever the formal powers of sanction the government will not feel 
threatened by the assembly so long as the dominant party continues to enjoy an overwhelming 
majority (made more likely by the president's constitutional power to appoint up to eight 
nominated members, not subject to ratification). The 'payroll vote', where the government can 
count on securing the votes of ministers and their deputies through the doctrine of collective 
responsibility, presently numbers 68. In the MMD the National Executive Committee controls 
the nomination of parliamentary candidates and its organisational and financial support is 
often critical to a candidate's chances of winning the seat.  Similar arrangements have existed 
in other parties. In these circumstances the passive attitude many MMD MPs show towards 
their government's failings needs little explanation. Nor is it unique: in Britain Weir and 
Beetham hold party discipline responsible for their judgment that the idea that the Commons 
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'is an agent of scrutiny and accountability is entirely subverted'.lxvi Thus Zambia's political 
opposition may well have to look more to extra-parliamentary instruments of accountability 
like the judiciary to provide security against abuse of executive power. If, however, the ruling 
party was challenged by a strong opposition party or if increasing factionalism made it highly 
fragile (the issue of a presidential third term for Chiluba provoked major splits in the MMD, 
early in 2001), then the agencies of parliamentary accountability would gain more leverage. At 
minimum the burden of giving the committees a sharp edge, which so far has been borne by 
just a handful of opposition and Independent MPs, would be more evenly shared. The 
effective power of committees might be enhanced even more in a situation where the President 
did not represent the dominant party and was obliged to operate some form of cohabitation 
with the assembly. But there is an important caveat. An increase in the government's insecurity 
and, even more so a direct role for committees in the legislative process, could introduce a 
much firmer determination to impose party discipline on MPs in committee. That would 
endanger the benefits of the current willingness of committee members to reach a consensus 
on critical reports. Moreover there are reasons for believing that even a more competitive party 
system and greater insecurity of government would not be a sufficient condition for the 
Parliamentary committees to have considerably greater impact. 
 
Third, then, it is customary to admit that the principal underlying determinant of the 
extent to which legislatures perform as checks on the executive is the political will of the 
legislators.lxvii On balance the political culture in Zambia reinforces the executive dominance 
sanctioned by the constitution and weakens the powers of the assembly. In part this refers to 
the traditional combination of deference and fear exhibited towards State House. The 
President's constitutional position as head of state - the symbol of national unity - as well as 
head of government encourages this, as does the fact that he possesses his own electoral 
mandate. It has been accentuated by the authoritarianism associated with the country's first 
two presidents, although it is worth noting that a 'malaise of the spirit' has also been found 
responsible for the British Parliament's habit of deferring to the executive's interpretation of  
conventions governing their relations.lxviii In part also, and rather more special to Zambia 
(though widespread in Africa) is the neo-patrimonial and clientelistic basis of political 
relationships that is ingrained within both the political and the administrative spheres. It 
undercuts attempts to make sound policy performance and competent governance for the 
betterment of the whole society the determining yardsticks for assessing governmental 
performance and rewarding success/penalising failure. As the recent campaign for a 
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presidential 'third term' demonstrates, money has the power to buy political support, 
particularly when it is in short supply, even though the objective is not always attained. The 
widely shared perception that Parliament is just a 'rubber stamp' is another historical fact that 
continues to militate against the chances of it being taken more seriously. When it undermines 
efforts to make a sustained attempt at reform, a sense of impotence will beget impotence. 
 
Fourth, high levels of public apathy and low levels of political participation, which 
show up in weak figures for voter registration and electoral turnouts, are a pronounced feature 
of the political culture among the general populacelxix Of course once again we should beware 
of simplistic judgments. The limitations of the Electoral Commission have contributed to the 
ineffectiveness of voter registration drives, and the responsibility for this lies with the 
government's refusal to provide adequate resources. In addition there must be doubts about the 
electoral process, not so much because of ballot-rigging but because the pre-poll 
circumstances prevent a level playing field. For instance the police force has been thoroughly 
politicised.  The police proscribe political meetings and demonstrations where they claim they 
could not guarantee public safety, but do so in a highly partisan fashion. They have 
consistently disallowed events planned by parties and NGOs opposing the government, and 
given a virtual carte blanche to the MMD, even where it has not observed the proper 
procedures, and they have turned a blind eye to violence by MMD supporters. All these factors 
can only serve to blunt the effectiveness even of a moderately strong opposition party in its 
endeavours to make government accountable. And against such a background arguments about 
the potentially negative electoral consequences of ignoring the recommendations of 
parliamentary committees or of being compelled by Parliament to replace ministers will not 
cause the government much anxiety or compel it to reform its behaviour.  Here, the 
development of a more secure and vibrant private media - radio and television as well as press 
- would offer a positive force for change especially by giving more sustained publicity to 
committee findings and providing independent commentary and analysis. That said, the 
widespread poverty and weak economic conditions will continue to pose major barriers not 
just to the flourishing of independent media but a highly participatory form of politics, for 
some considerable time to come. 
 
Finally, the committee reports create an indelible impression that within the public 
service the substitution of professional norms and an ethos of personal responsibility for 
inertia and indiscipline are essential but unlikely to be achieved without a reworking of the 
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incentive structures. Strengthening the political accountability of the government to the 
legislature is hardly worthwhile if the persistence of old patterns of behaviour among civil 
servants means there is little administrative accountability. The same is equally true if the 
bureaucratic component is incapable of responding to the directives the political executive sets 
after listening to Parliament and the people, because of a shortage of resources.  
 
In conclusion, in Zambia fundamental change in the formal and informal institutions of 
politics has tended to proceed slowly. For example the 1999 reform establishing parliamentary 
committees to oversee every department was first suggested in 1990, in the Report of the 
Constitution Commission. The full benefits of that still seem some way off. Right now there is 
a political ferment that might place Zambia on the threshold of an accelerated process of 
political reform. But only a confirmed optimist would bet that Parliament's committees will 
soon be making a much more effective contribution to democratic government. 
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